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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PATRICIA WADE, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
vs. : 
RICHARD BURKE, et al, : Case No. 890135 
Defendants/Appellants. : Category 14b 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this Appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2 (a)-3(j) . 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Appeal is taken from a decision by Judge Homer 
Wilkinson, sitting without a jury, denying Defendant Richard 
Burke7s Motion for Summary Judgment on November 4, 1988 and is a 
final Order, following the entry of Summary Judgment on behalf of 
the Plaintiff against co-Defendant, Sandra Maxwell. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Trial Court erred in failing to grant 
Defendant Richard Burke's Motion for Summary Judgment based upon 
the statute of limitations in two (2) different hearings on 
March 25, 1988 and on November 4, 1988. 
2. Whether the Trial Court erred in determining that the 
striking of a trial date, on the basis of purported settlement 
thus striking a Motion hearing, when the settlement was not 
authorized by Appellant, precludes the Appellant from raising 
1 
the statute of limitations Motion subsequent thereto. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR RULES 
The two (2) statutory provisions in quest^pu in this 
appeal are: 
a. Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civ|p_ Procedure 
(See entire Rule attached to Addendum hereto and marked Exhibit 
I!A!!; and 
b. Section 78-12-26(3) of the Utah Co&e 'nMotated 
(See entire Section attached to Addendum hereto emu marked 
Exhibit »B". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This was an action filed by a divorced spouse against her 
former spouse and the spouse's sister to secure a one-half (1/2) 
interest in real property on the basis that prior to the parties 
divorce, the property had been fraudulently transferred by the 
spouse to the sister in order to defeat any claim that 1 he spouse 
would have to a marital interest in said property. 
On October 8, 1985, the action was filed and following a 
dismissal of the action without prejudice on February 9f 1987 for 
failure to prosecute, a new Amended Complaint was file/ and the 
case was allowed to proceed. Following the "filing of a second 
Amended Complaint on March 25, 1988, a Motion for Summary 
Judgment based upon the running of the statute of limitations was 
made, but was not decided by the Court to allow Plaintiff further 
discovery. 
That Motion was to be reheard on July 22, 1988, prior to 
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a Trial which was to commence July 26, 1988. Counsel for one of 
the Defendants, Sandra Maxwell, and for the Plaintiff believed 
that they had entered into a settlement and therefore, counsel 
for the Plaintiff struck the trial date. 
Following this, it became apparent that the settlement 
had not been reached and the Defendant Richard Burke's Motion for 
Summary Judgment based on the statute of limitations was renewed 
on November 4, 1988. At that time, the Judge denied the Motion 
both on its merits and on the basis that it had been rendered 
moot because of a Summary Judgment being rendered against the 
Defendants following the repudiated settlement agreement, as a 
solution for Defendant's failure to provide disovery, and it is 
from that decision that this appeal is taken. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Plaintiff, Patricia Wade, and Defendant, Richard 
Burke, were married to each other for in excess of sixteen (16) 
years and in 1977 divorce proceedings ensued between the two in 
Civil No. D-15225 in the District Court of Salt Lake County. 
The parties were initially divorced in 1978, but all 
matters concerning property were reserved until a trial on the 
merits. 
On October 24, 1980, a trial was held on the merits 
before the Honorable Ernest R. Baldwin. At that time, the 
Plaintiff was asserting an interest in various pieces of 
property, including a home, adjoining pasture land and property 
designated as "the Pepperwood Property", which at that time was 
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undeveloped real estate property located in Southeast Salt Jake 
County. 
The primary issue at the Trial was whether any of these 
properties were marital assets. The home and pasture land had 
originally been purchased by Advance Business Equipment, a 
company where the Defendant had a minority interest and the 
Pepperwood property which had been originally purchased by 
Advance Business Equipment and was subsequently sold to Sandra-
Maxwell some four and one-half (4 1/2) years prior to the divorce 
proveedings of October, 1980. 
The Plaintiff's position at the time of the divorce trial 
was that all properties were part of the marital estate and had 
in fact, been improperly or fraudulently transferred by the 
Defendant in order to deplete the marital estate. 
During the 1980 hearing the specific question of the 
transfer of the Pepperwood property to Maxwell was discussed on 
the record and Plaintiff's attorney, who at that time was Gerald 
Gundry, examined the parties concerning this transfer, Specific 
questions were asked of the Defendant, Burke, as to whom the 
transfer was made, when and what the consideration was, 
The following colloquy ensued between the Defendant, 
Burke and Mr. Gundry concerning the property which is described 
in the transcript of the divorce proceedings, pages 15-21 and 
149-150 as follows: 
Q. Have you ever owned any property since the inception 
of the business besides what you have described? 
A. Yes. The business owned 15 acres of ground in the 
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Bell Bench area. (The 15 acres referred to is the Pepperwood 
property at issue located in the Bell Bench area) 
Q. What happened to it? 
A. Because the company was not financially able to make 
payments on the property, it was transferred out. 
Q. And whom was it transferred to? 
A. To Sandra Maxwell. 
Q. That's your sister? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. What consideration did the corporation receive for 
the transfer of that property? By consideration I mean money, 
things of that nature. 
A. Well, just the agreement she would help down at the 
business at a little later date when we needed her without pay. 
Q. When was that assignment made? 
A. Oh, I am not sure of the date. About January, I 
think, of what, '7 6? 
Q. Let me show you what has been marked Exhibit 1-P and 
ask you if you have ever seen a document like that before. Have 
you seen one like that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is this the assignment of contract whereby you 
purported to transfer the interest of Advance Business Equipment 
to Sandra L. Maxwell? 
A. Yes. 
THE COURT: I will strike the word "purported11. That's a 
conclusion, Mr. Gundry. 
MR. GUNDRY: All right. 
THE COURT: Mr. Caine, I would imagine you wouldn't want 
that purported in the record. 
MR. CAINE: No, your honor, but I know where he's going, 
so I will let him. 
THE COURT: Let's do it. I don't want to have to — this 
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is the document and the document speaks for itself. 
Q. (By Mr. Gundry) All right. This document is dated 
the 27th of February, 1976. To your recollection, was it 
executed on or about that date? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Where was that document executed? 
A. In Ogden. 
Q. When did Advanced Business Equipment acquire .any 
interest in that 15' acre tract of land? 
A. Oh, just a couple of years prior to that time. 
Q. What was the nature of that acquisition? By that JQ 
mean how was the property acquired? What kind of a transaction 
was it? 
A. Oh, just a couple of years prior to that time. 
Q. What was the nature of that acquisition? By that It 
mean how was the property acquired? What kind of a transaction! 
was it? 
A. Well, the property was purchased for the purpose of.. 
THE COURT: Now, how did you buy it, on a contract, deed, 
mortgage, or what, is what I want to know. How did you buy it? 
THE WITNESS: I believe it was on a contract, 
Q. (By Mr. Gundry) Who was the seller that you 
purchased the land from? 
A. Mr. Fisher. 
Q. Hamlet R. Fisher? 
A. Pardon me? 
Q. Hamlet R. Fisher? 
A. I never knew his first name was Hamlet^ but that 
could be the same one. 
Q. H.R. Fisher? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Did you make payments on that contract subsequent to 
the time you signed it? 
A. No, I don't believe there was any payments made prior 
to the signing of it. 
Q. No, I say subsequent to when you signed it, after 
you signed it, did you make payment on it? 
A. Oh, yes, there was, yes. Advanced Business Equipment 
made a few payments on it, that's correct. 
Q. Well, how many payments would you have made? 
A. Well, I don't recall the number. Three or four, I 
imagine. 
Q. When was the contract signed; do you recall. 
A. No, I don't know that. 
Q. Do you recall the amount of the payments? 
A. As I remember, it was about $2,000 a year. 
Q. Was it an annual payment? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did you decide that you had to transfer the 
property? 
A. When we found out that our business operations were 
just not doing what we expected them to do and we did just not 
have the money to make any further payments on the property. 
Q. Do you recall how much you paid for it? 
A. I think $20,000. 
THE COURT: Is that the contract price or the down 
payment? 
THE WITNESS: No. That's the contract price. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you know what the down payment 
was? 
THE WITNESS: No. I don't recall, your Honor. 
Q. (By Mr. Gundry) When you decided to transfer this 
property when I say "you11 I mean the corporation — to your 
sister in February 1976, did you ha a a meeting of the Boacd of 
Directors for the transfer of that property? 
A. I believe we did. 
Q. Do you have a corporate resolution? 
A. I don't recall if we do or not. We could have. 
Q. Do you recall who was present at the meeting of the 
Board of Directors? 
A. I am trying to think back to the first part of '764, 
and I believe that Nicky Emery was the secretary of the 
corporation and she was there and, of course, myself and I don't 
know if anybody else was present or not. 
Q. At that time was it mentioned at the Board of 
Directors meeting the property would be transferred to your 
sister? 
A. I believe it was. 
Q. And was that done subsequent to that time, was it 
done after that time? 
A. Well, it would have been done right at that time. 
Q. Did you ever inform the seller, Mr. Fisherf that you 
transferred your interest in the real estate contract? 
A. Yes, I did tell him that. 
Q. And when would you have told him that? 
A. Well, I don't exactly recall, but I assume that I 
told him that when the next coming payment was dneP which I 
believe was in April, two or three months after the property was 
assigned. 
Pages 149-151 (Examination by Mr. Caine, Defendant's Attorney) 
Q. All right. Mr. Burke, let's talk a little bit about 
the Pepperwood, Bell Bench property. Your wife has testified, 
and I think you heard her testify, regarding a conversation that 
you had prior to the purchase of that property with her up on the 
site concerning your desire to purchase it as an investment. Do 
you recall that testimony? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you remember that conversation? 
8 
A. No, I don't ever recall taking here up there. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Except maybe driving up through the Dimple Dell area 
and stating, you know, "sometime it might be a good idea to try 
to buy some property in there inasmuch as it might be a " 
Q. Did you ever intend to purchase that property in your 
individual name? 
MR. GUNDRY: I object. That's immaterial. 
THE COURT: Be sustained. 
Q. (By Mr. Caine) all right. When you purchased it, 
it was purchased in the name of the company? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. All right. Did you in fact ever purchase it in your 
name and then transfer it into the company? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. All right. There was only one transaction? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And that was with Mr. H.R. Fisher whose deposition 
has just been given to the Judge to read; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Is that the individual who you dealt with? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. Now, so the record is clear, you handled the 
negotiation; is that a fair statement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. And the company made the required yearly 
payments on the contract with Mr. Fisher for a number of years; 
is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. All right. And you have previously testified with 
Mr. Gundry about the circumstances which caused the company to 
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take the property and transfer it to Sandra Maxwell; is that 
right? 
A. Yes. 
THE COURT: What was that property. What do we refer 
that to, the Sandra Maxwell transfer? 
MR, CAINE: That's the transfer of the Bell Bench 
property from Advanced Business to Sandra Maxwell, is that 
correct? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Is this point to be covered in the 
deposition, the original transaction? 
MR. CAINE: Right. The original transaction is covered 
in there, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Q. (By Mr. Caine) All right. And as far as you know, 
Sandra Maxwell or her assignees are now paying for that property? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Since the transfer, which you testified was in the 
early part of 1977— 
A. No, 1976. 
Q. 1976, I am sorry. Have you personally made any 
payments from your own personal funds on that contract with H.R. 
Fisher? 
A. No, I haven't. 
Q. Has Advanced Business Equipment made any payments on 
that contract? 
A. No, it hasn't. 
Following the trial the Court determined that the home 
and pasture land property was in fact a marital asset, but 
determined that the Court had no jurisdiction to make a 
distribution of the Pepperwood property, as it had been 
transferred prior to the action and therefore, was not marital 
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property. 
Although the ruling was made at that time and was made 
known to all parties a Decree of Divorce was not entered until a 
Nunc Pro Tunc Decree was signed on September 19, 1984. No 
further action took place in connection with the Pepperwood 
property until on October 8, 1985, some five (5) years after the 
divorce hearing, the Plaintiff initiated this action, alleging 
that the Defendant had fraudulently and without consideration, 
transferred the Pepperwood property from the marital estate to 
Defendant Maxwell in an attempt to hinder, delay and create a 
fraud upon the Court and that said property was therefore, part 
of the marital estate and she was entitled to a one-half 
interest. 
Thereafter, on December 10, 1986, an Amended Complaint 
was filed in this matter, which Complaint contained no new 
information, and on December 16, 1986 the lower Court caused to 
be issued, on its own Motion, an Order To Show Cause why the 
action should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. 
On February 9, 1987, the Court entered an Order 
dismissing the case without prejudice. Plaintiff's counsel then 
served a new Summons, dated April 8, 1987 and attached the 
Amended Complaint of December 10, 1986, both under the old Civil 
Number. 
Following a succession of hearings, the Court held on 
June 26, 1987, that the second Amended Complaint could be filed, 
the prior dismissal would be set aside and the matter could 
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proceed. 
The second Amended Complaint was filed on July 10, 3 987 
at which time answers were filed by all Defendant parties. 
On March 25, 1988, a Motion was filed by Defendant 
Maxwell pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
for Summary Judgment. The Motion specifically addressed on the 
issue of the three (3) year statute of limitations for fraud and 
the fact that Plaintiff's filing of the case in 1985 exceeded the 
three (3) year statute on the basis that she had knowledge of the 
alleged fraud in the transfer of the property at least in October 
of 1980, if not before. 
That at the hearing, Plaintiff's counsel, Mark Larsen, 
convinced the Court that he needed additional discovery by way of 
depositions of the parties and interrogatories which had not been 
undertaken at that time and that said discovery would demonstrate 
that Plaintiff was within the statute of limitations period. 
The Court declined to rule on Defendant's Motion at that 
time and allowed discovery to continue. Following the hearing, 
depositions were taken of the parties and no new information was 
elicited that would alter the fact that the matter of the 
Pepperwood transfer and the allegation of fraud was discussed in 
the trial of the parties divorce in October of 1980. 
Plaintiff did bring a Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
basis that some of the Defendants had not complied with 
discovery. The parties then attempted settlement in late July at 
the time a renewal Motion for Summary Judgment was made prior to 
12 
a trial date. 
Following the striking of the trial date and a 
determination by the Court that in fact, Defendant Maxwell had 
failed to comply with discovery, Judgment for Plaintiff against 
the Defendant Maxwell was entered. Defendant Burke then made a 
subsequent Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of statute of 
limitations on November 4, 1988 and said Motion was denied, thus 
necessitating this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Judge in the lower Court erred in failing to grant on 
two (2) occasions, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment based 
upon the failure of the Plaintiff to bring her action within the 
three (3) year statutory period required for the bringing of an 
action for fraud and on the basis of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel. 
In addition, if in fact a statute of limitation violation 
exists, the Court cannot cure that violation and claim it moot on 
the basis that the Defendants failed to comply with discovery and 
therefore, Summary Judgment was appropriate against them as a 
sanction pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
PLAINTIFF'S CASE WAS BARRED BY THE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN GRANTED DISMISSING THE ACTION 
WITH PREJUDICE 
Plaintiff's claim in her second Amended Complaint in 
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essence alleges that the transfer of property between Advanced 
Business Equipment and/or Dick Burke to the Defendant, Maxwell, 
was fraudulent in that the Defendants to the action, Maxwell and 
Burke, made fraudulent representations to the Court at the time 
of the hearing on the divorce concerning the Pepperwood property 
and that in fact, the entire transfer was a sham, was without 
consideration and was made purposely to exclude the property from 
the marital estate at the time of the divorce. 
The transfer of the Pepperwood property from Defendant 
Burke to Defendant Maxwell actually occurred on the 2 7th day of 
February, 1976. The Plaintiff in the present action discovered 
what she claimed was a fraud subsequent to that time because the 
matter was raised by her counsel, Gerald Gundry, through 
deposition and interrogatory requests prior to the trial of the 
matter in 1980. 
At the Trial on October 24, 1980 the Plaintiff had full 
knowledge of what she believed to be a fraudulent conveyance and 
the matter was extensively discussed, both in th< trial and in 
the subsequent Memorandums to the Court, which the .uurt required 
following the hearing. It is clear therefore, tha'c the Plaintiff 
knew of the transfer and believed the same to be fraudulent at 
that time. 
It is further clear that the Plaintiff in effect, took no 
action with respect to this purported knowledge until the present 
action was filed in 1985. 
Utah Judicial Code 78-12-26(3) states with respect to the 
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period of limitation for filing an action based on fraud: 
"Within three (3) years, an action for relief on 
the grounds of fraud or mistake, except that the 
cause of action in this case does not accrue 
until the discovery of the aggrieved party of the 
facts constituting the fraud or mistake.11 
There is no question that the Plaintiff had discovered 
the action she believed constituted a fraud prior to 1980 and the 
subsequent efforts by her attorney in this case to suggest to the 
Trial Court that there was additional discovery necessary to 
bring forth additional facts was simply a smokescreen to hide the 
fact that the Plaintiff in this action has known for six (6) 
years prior to the filing of the Complaint that a fraud allegedly 
existed. 
There was nothing elicited in subsequent discovery that 
changes the fact of the divorce hearing testimony and the 
allegations that the Plaintiff raised at that time concerning the 
fraudulent act. 
What is also clear, is that the Utah Supreme Court has 
determined that the statute of limitations is an affirmative 
defense pursuant to Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and acts as a complete bar to an action if it is 
violated. Trinnaman v. dinger, 485 P.2d 1043"(Utah 1971), while 
it is true that the statute of limitations can be waived, if it 
is invoked as an affirmative defense pursuant to Rule 8(e) and is 
proven, then it acts as a bar to recovery. 
American Coal v. Sandstrom, 689 P. 2d 1 (Utah 1984) In this case 
the Defendant not only plead the statute of limitations as an 
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affirmative defense, but raised it in two (2) separate Motions, 
so there was obviously no waiver. Once the statutory period has 
run, the Court has no authority to grant any type of relief, even 
under equitable theories, or relief as in this case, on the basis 
of a sanction against the parties for failure to respond to 
discovery. In cases involving an allegation of fraud, the key to 
determining if the statute of limitations has run is when the 
Plaintiff knew or should have known of the claimed fraudulent 
act. 
The Court is directed to the early case of 
Waite v. Bailey, 147 P. 899 (Utah 1915) , in which this Court 
held: 
"That the time begins to run from the time that 
the aggrieved party knew or should have know the 
facts constituting the fraud." 
See also, McConkie v. Hartman, 529 P.2d 801 (Utah 1974) 
In this case, it is abundantly clear that the Plaintiff knew of 
the alleged fraudulent activity in 1980. It is also clear from 
the nature of the questions asked of the Defendant, Burke, by 
Plaintiff's attorney, in Plaintiff's presence, during the trial, 
that she believed that a fraudulent action had taken place 
concerning the transfer of the property at* the time of the 
hearing. 
Furthermore, the Plaintiff failed to allege any specific 
event in either the initial Complaint or the two (2) Amended 
Complaints in this action, which was uncovered subsequent to 198 2 
(the three (3) year period from which the discovery would have to 
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have been made in order to not violate the statute of 
limitations) that suddenly brought the alleged fraudulent 
activity to the Plaintiff's attention. 
The simple fact is that the Plaintiff knew and believed 
in 1980 that a fraud had been committed and basically waited too 
long to file her action. 
A statute of limitations violation is a complete bar to 
proceeding further in a case and the Court should have, at the 
initial hearing in March of 1988, when all the above matters were 
presented, granted the Defendant's Motion and terminated the 
action. Its failure to do so, is reversible error. 
POINT TWO 
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION SHOULD BE PERMANENTLY BARRED 
BASED ON THE DOCTRINES OF RES JUDICATA AND 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
A Motion for Summary Judgment, based upon res judicata is 
appropriate where the moving party can demonstrate that a prior 
legal action made findings of fact and determinations of law as 
to the truthfulness of the allegations presently raised. See 
International Resources v. Dunfield, 599 P.2d 515 (Utah 1979) 
Where the record of prior adjudication sustains the fact that the 
issues and facts presently before the Court have been addressed 
in a prior matter, the Motion for Summary Judgment should be 
granted. See Parrish v. Layton City Corp. , 542 P. 2d 1086 (Utah 
1975) 
The causes of action, facts and issues raised by the 
instant action were fully litigated and a final decision rendered 
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in the case of Burke v. Burke, Civil No. D-15225. Hence the 
Plaintiff having been a party to that action is permanently 
barred from relitigating the same issues in this or any other 
judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction. The doctrine of 
res judicata requires that an exiting final Judgment, rendered 
upon the merits by a Court of competent jurisdiction, is 
conclusive as to the parties in all other actions. See 
Barnard v. Atteburv, 629 P.2d 892 (Utah 1981) 
Moreover, the Plaintiff, having been a party to the prior 
action of Burke is collaterally estopped from relitigating facts 
and issues in this action that were fully litigated in the prior 
suit. Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978) 
(holding that collateral estoppel prevents parties or their 
privies from relitigating facts and issues in a second suit that 
were fully litigated in a prior action). Therefore, the 
Plaintiff having had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
those issues in the prior action of Burke, should not be allowed 
to relitigate those issues in this action and should be 
collaterally estopped from doing so. Accord Blonder-Tongue v. 
University of Illinois, 402 U.S. 313 (1971); Bernard v. Bank of 
America, 19 Cal.2d 689, (1942) (the above rule of issue 
preclusion is often referred to as the "Bernard" rule). See also 
Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (citing the rule as 
pronounced in Bernard with approval). 
In the instant case, the facts and issues regarding the 
conveyance of the Pepperwood property to Ms. Maxwell were 
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specifically raised and addressed by the Court in the case of 
Burke v. Burke and said property was specifically determined not 
to be marital property. (See Recorder's transcript of 
proceedings, pages 3, 11, 15-21, 28-38, 43-45, 49-52, 66-69, 74, 
84, 122-125, 133, 136, 149-155, 164-173, 178 in Burke v. Burke 
Civil No. D-152 2 4 attached as an Addendum to Defendant's Summary 
Judgment Motion and Record on Appeal). 
Hence, a Judgment by the Court in Burke, after a full and 
fair hearing on the issue of conveyance is a bar to the present 
action and the issues raised therein, and is conclusive as to 
these parties. See Barnard v. Atteburv, supra; and Searle 
Brothers v. Searle, supra. 
Moreover, the Plaintiff cannot be heard to raise in this 
case that which she should have raised during the prior 
litigation. International Resources v. Dunfield, 599 P. 2d 515 
(Utah 1978) (holding that res judicata is not only a bar to those 
issues raised, but all issues that could have been raised). 
Hence, any allegations raised by the Plaintiff in this 
action should have been raised in the matter of Burke v. Burke, 
Plaintiff had an additional remedy concerning the failure 
of the Trial Court, in the divorce action," to find that the 
Pepperwood property was marital property, thus giving her a 
statutory interest, and this was to appeal the decision. The 
Defendant, Richard Burke, appealed the case in this action to the 
Utah Supreme Court and raised other issues concerning the 
distribution of the property. At no time in the response to the 
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appeal did the Plaintiff raise the issue of the failure of the 
Court to allow her an interest in the Pepperwood property. (See 
Record on Appeal in Case No. 2404) 
The Plaintiff, therefore, should have been permanently 
barred from bringing the present action because of the doctrines 
of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT'S ACTION IN IMPOSING A 
RULE 5 6 SANCTION BY GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF BECAUSE 
ONE OF THE DEFENDANTS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH 
DISCOVERY DOES NOT RENDER A DECISION ON 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS QUESTION MOOT 
The District Court Judge in his November 4th rulingF in 
essence made two (2) decisions. The fact is that he denied 
Defendant's Motion on the merits and his error in that respect 
has been discussed in Points One and Two above. 
Secondly, the Court also ruled that in effect, the 
statute of limitations question was moot because of his Summary 
Judgment ruling against the Defendants. The Judge's position in 
this respect is also cloaked with error. 
There is no question that the Defendants had raised the 
issue of the statute of limitations before any Rule 56 Motion had 
been granted on March 25, 1988, and the Court simply declined to 
rule on it at that time because of the request by the Plaintiff 
for additional discovery. 
The next series of events are not as clear, but 
essentially, the parties attempted to settle the case, a 
settlement was entered, a trial date was stricken, the 
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settlement was unraveled and then because the Plaintiff contended 
that Defendant Maxwell had not responded to certain 
interrogatories or request for production of documents, a Rule 56 
Motion for Summary Judgment was made on the basis of a sanction 
to grant Judgment for the failure to provide the documents. 
The Court granted Summary Judgment as against Defendant 
Maxwell only and not against the co-Defendant, Burke, and in 
fact, no Judgment against Defendant Burke had been rendered prior 
to the bringing of the November 4th Motion for Summary Judgment 
on his behalf on the basis of the failure of the statute of 
limitations. 
If in fact the statute of limitations is a bar to 
recovery in a case, where it has been violated, then the Court's 
ruling concerning the issue of mootness fails on its face. That 
is to say, if factually the statute of limitations is not met by 
the Plaintiff, any action taken subsequent thereto in the case is 
subject to being voided because the Court had no auuthority to 
grant relief to a Plaintiff who files an action outside of the 
statutory period. 
The evidence is compelling that this Plaintiff simply 
failed to file her suit in the time frame' for this type of 
action and the Judge should have granted Summary Judgment to all 
Defendant on the March 2 5th hearing. No new discovery changed 
the fact of Plaintiff's basic knowledge of the events surrounding 
this transfer in October of 1980, a time clearly outside the 
statute of limitations period. 
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Therefore, the Court cannot in effect cure Plaintiffs 
own negligence and circumvent the statutue of limitations 
requirement by simply claiming mootness. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Plaintiff in this case knew of the 
alleged fraudulent transfer of property at least in October of 
1980. Her action was filed in 1985, clearly outside the three 
(3) year statute of limitations. The Defendant's Motions should 
have been granted and this Court must now reverse the lower 
Court's action and determine that the Plaintiff's Complaint 
should be dismissed with prejudice on the basis of statute of 
limitations violation, res judicata andycollateral estoppel. 
s 4 ^ a a v of May,, l< RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thi  989, 
Attorney for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct 
copies of the above and foregoing Brief of Defendants/Appellants 
to counsel for the Plaintiff/Respondent, Mark A. Larsen, Attorney 
/ 
at Law, 310 South Main, Suite #1330, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, 
postage prepaid this <[ j^ffay of May, 
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78-12-26 JUDICIAL CODE 
History: C. 1953, 78-12-25.5, enacted by L. 1967, Chapter 218, which appears as this sec-
1967, ch. 218, § 1. tion. 
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this Cross-References. — Product Liability Act. 
act," referred to in Subsection (2), means Laws statute of limitations, k 78-15-3. 
Wrongful death, §§ 78-11-6, 78-11-7. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality 
Time statute commences to run. 
—Completion of construction. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. Time statute commences to run. 
Seven-year limitation is applicable to the . 
owner or tenant in possession at time of con- -Complet ion of construction. 
struciion, or to their successors; those in pos- T h ^ s , s e c t l 0 n P r 0 V l d e s t h e t i m e w h e n &e s t a t " 
session and control of realty have a continuing \ t e o f limitations commences to run as being at 
j , . ! • j i u j - the completion of construction, and not discov-
duty to make repairs, and should discover any _ F ..
 TT ,TT ' _ _. 
r -n. • A. .• -.I • i • ery of negligence. Hooper Water Imp. Dist. v. 
fault in construction within seven years; claim ^ J /,?« ^ « , „ , r ^ , , ^ ^ 
+v, . ., f f , ... f i . -f, . Reeve. 642 P.2d 745 (Utah 1982). 
that the statute is unconstitutional is without 
merit. Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah Cited in Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp. (D. 
1974). Utah 1986) 634 F. Supp. 100. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 13 Am. Jur. 2d Building and A.L.R. — Time of discovery as affecting run-
Construction Contracts § 114. ning of statute of limitations in wrongful death 
A.L.R. — What statute of limitations gov- action, 49 A.L.R.4th 972. 
erns action by contractee for defective or im- Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions <£= 
proper performance of work by private build- 55(3). 
ing contractor, 1 A.L.R.3d 914. 
78-12-26. Within three years. 
Within three years: 
(1) an action for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property; 
except that when waste or trespass is committed by means of under-
ground works upon any mining claim, the cause of action does not accrue 
until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting such 
waste or trespass. 
(2) an action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, in-
cluding actions for specific recovery thereof; except that in all cases where 
the subject of the action is a domestic animal usually included in the term 
"livestock/' which at the time of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if 
the animal strayed or was stolen from the true owner without the owner's 
fault, the cause does not accrue until the owner has actual knowledge of 
such facts as would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the posses-
sion of the animal by the defendant. 
(3) an action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that 
the cause of action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the 
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake. 
(4) an action for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other 
than for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 8 
Motions. 
—Amendments. 
Prayer for relief. 
Although a trial court may deny a motion to 
amend the complaint for a movant's failure to 
present a written motion and a proposed 
amended complaint, that rule does not apply to 
the prayer for relief because, under Rule 54(c), 
U.R.C.P., the prayer does not limit the relief 
which the court may grant. Behrens v. Raleigh 
Hills Hosp., 675 R2d 1179 (Utah 1983). 
—Mistrial. 
Prejudice. 
In personal injury action arising out of auto 
collision, mention of insurance does not auto-
matically result in such prejudice in jury that 
motion for mistrial necessarily should be 
granted. Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 
261, 409 P.2d 121 (1965). 
—New trial. 
Particularization. 
Only purpose for requiring particularization 
of grounds for motion for new trial is to inform 
court and other party of theories upon which 
new trial is sought; where defendant filed affi-
davit with motions setting forth theories, and 
judgment had been on pleadings, court and 
parties were sufficiently advised as to grounds 
for motion. Howard v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 
149, 356 P.2d 275 (1960). 
—Setting aside conditional order. 
Where court on own initiative lowered from 
$2,000 to $1,000 value of building as found by 
jury and entered conditional order granting 
new trial unless plaintiff consented to reduc-
tion, court could restore jury findings under 
authority of this Rule, since plaintiff filed mo-
tion to set aside conditional order for new trial 
within ten days. National Farmers' Union 
Property & Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 
286 P.2d 249, 61 A.L.R.2d 635 (1955). 
Orders. 
—Correction. 
Where judge made perfunctory or clerical 
mistake resulting from erroneous assumption 
that order prepared by counsel correctly re-
flected judgment of Supreme Court and trial 
court, judge could correct order on his own mo-
tion. Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 5 Utah 2d 196, 
299 P.2d 827 (1956). 
Cited in Boskovich v. Utah Constr. Co., 123 
Utah 387, 259 P.2d 885 (1953); Thomas v. 
Heirs of Braffet, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P.2d 507 
(1956). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, 
Rules, and Orders § 1 et seq., 61A Am. Jur. 2d 
Pleading §§ 1 et seq., 238. 
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § 1 
et seq.; 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 63 to 210, 140 et 
seq., 211 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Proceeding for summary judgment 
as affected by presentation of counterclaim, 8 
A.L.R.3d 1361. 
Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action 
as affected by opponent's motion for summary 
judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or di-
rected verdict, 36 A L.R.3d 1113. 
Key Numbers. — Motions e= 1 et seq.; 
Pleading <&= 38V2 to 186, 187 et seq. 
Rule 8. General rules of pleadings. 
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, 
whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, 
shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to 
which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several differ-
ent types may be demanded. 
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms 
his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments 
upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or informa-
tion sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state 
and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of 
the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a 
part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true 
and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends 
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in good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he 
may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments cr para-
graphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated 
averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does s: intend 
to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial subj -r;:, :o the 
obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party 
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration' ar,d award, 
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, 
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, 
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of 
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance of affir-
mative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense a:;. 3. coun-
terclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so 
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper •'.[ ..Ration. 
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to whr.n , respon-
sive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of < 4 mage, are 
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a plead-
ing to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be tpken as 
denied or avoided. 
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency. 
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple., concise, and direct. No 
technical forms of pleading or motions are required. 
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense 
alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate 
counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alter-
native and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the 
pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the 
alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims 
or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal 
or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject 
to the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice. 
Compi l e r ' s No te s . — This rule is substan-
tially the same as Rule 8, F.R.C.P. 
Cross -Refe rences . — Amended and supple-
menta l pleadings, Rule 15. 
Arbitration, § 78-3 la-1 et seq. 
Comparative negligence, § 78-27-37. 
Counterclaim and cross-claim, Rule 13. 
Creditors, assignment for benefit of, § 6-1-1 
et seq. 
Defenses and objections, Rule 12. 
Fee for filing cross-claim or counterclaim, 
§ 21-2-2. 
Fellow servant defined, § 34-25-2. 
Form of pleadings, Rule 10. 
Forms intended to indicate simplicity and 
brevity of statement, Rule 84. 
Forms of answers, Forms 21, 22. 
Hear ing of certain defenses before trial, Rule 
12(d). 
Interpleader, Rule 22. 
Motions, forms for, Forms 20, 23 to 25. 
Numbered pa ragraphs , Rule 10(b). 
One form of action, Rule 2. 
Reply to answer, order for, Rule 7(a). 
Security interest , enforceability of, 
§ 70A-9-203. 
Special forms of pleadings and writs abol-
ished, Rule 65B(a). 
S ta tu te x)f frauds, generally, § 25-5-1 et seq. 
S ta tu te of frauds, investment securities, 
§ 70A-8-319. 
S ta tu te of frauds, sales, § 70A-2-201. 
Sta tu te of frauds, Uniform Commercial 
Code, personal property not otherwise covered, 
§ 70A-1-206. 
Third-party practice, Rule 14. 
Time for answer, Rules 3(b), 12(a). 
Uniform Commercial Code, supplementary 
principles of law applicable, § 70A-1-103. 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 56 
iihe defendant allowed to plead consistent 
S?our declared policy that in case of uncer-
*tt "default judgments should be set aside to 
2* trial on the merits . Locke v. Peterson, 3 
jf*2d 415, 285 P.2d 1111 (1955). 
fSfault judgment and writ of garnishment 
»'properly set aside where trial court failed 
btain jurisdiction over defendant because 
nons was not timely issued. Fibreboard 
: Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, 
^"p.2d 1005 (1970). 
Tiere appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action, 
nptly objected to date set for trial on the 
nd that their counsel had an already 
scheduled appearance in another court on that 
date, but due to fact t ha t there were no law or 
motion days between time objection was filed 
and trial date, objection was never heard, re-
fusal to set aside default judgment entered 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date 
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Ham-
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
Ci ted in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
J.P.W. Enters. , Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 
(Utah 1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 
1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
jfrigham Y o u n g L a w Review. — Reason-
je Assurance of Actual Notice Required for 
[^Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Gra-
.;v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937. 
^Am. Ju r . 2d. — 47 Am. Jur . 2d Judgments 
|H'1152 to 1213. 
rOJ.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218. 
ffc'AX.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to lia-
iKlity against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d 
|070. 
^Appealability of order setting aside, or refus-
llng to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d 
|l272. 
| Defaulting defendant's right to notice and 
Qg as to determination of amount of dam-
15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Opening default or default judgment claimed 
to have been obtained because of attorney's 
mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 
1255. 
Failure to give notice of application for de-
fault judgment where notice is required only 
by custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
Default judgments against the United States 
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
Key N u m b e r s . — Judgment «=> 92 to 134. 
tule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
|cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
l&xpiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
I S motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
par t thereof. 
"'(b) For d e f e n d i n g p a r t y . A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
pfoss-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
aove with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
|[avor as to all or any part thereof. 
pHc) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
JLO days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
|day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
ygndered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
J*Uid admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show tha t there is 
| ^P genuine issue as to any material fact and tha t the moving party is entitled 
p ° a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
^haracter , may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
| genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
;U. (d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
^judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
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tr ial is necessary, the cou ^t the hearing of the motion, by examining thlM 
pleadings and the evidence efore it and by interrogating counsel, rJiaUJ™ 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial co'ntipcjjj 
versy and what mater ia l facts are actually and in good faith• controvertedffiM 
shall thereupon make an oraer specifying the facts tha t appear without suB|~ 
s tant ia l controversy, including the extent to which the amount of dam ages t s j 
other relief is not in con t ro l 'y, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just . Upon the rial of the action the facts so specified shall_tj| 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) F o r m of aff idavits ; f i r ther tes t imony; defense r e q u i r e d . S u p p o r t 
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledfe, chall;cset 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirrria^ 
tively tha t the affiant is competent to testify to the mat ters stated tkexeii£|j 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be at tached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidjg 
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories" 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made a n d ! 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon th&| 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits.ora 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that"| 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary j u d g ^ 
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. ;}}% 
(f) When aff idavi ts a r e unava i l ab le . Should it appear from the affidavits * 
of a par ty opposing the motion tha t he cannot for reasons stated present by^j 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse t K § | 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to Bel 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make sucKj 
other order as is just . f | 
(g) Affidavits m a d e in b a d faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of J 
the court at any t ime tha t any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule* 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall J 
forthwith order the party employing them to pa.y to the other par ty tHe.| 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused* 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party^or | 
at torney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compi l e r ' s No te s . — This rule is similar to Cross-RefereB.ces. — Contempt generally?! 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et"seq. * " *' 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affidavit. 
—Contents. 
—Corporation. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
—Sufficiency. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony. 
—Superseding pleadings. 
—Unpleaded defenses. 
—Verified pleading. 
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